

Mccarty Meirowitz Solutions Political Game Theory

No legislature in the world has a greater influence over its nation's public affairs than the US Congress. The Congress's centrality in the US system of government has placed research on Congress at the heart of scholarship on American politics. Generations of American government scholars working in a wide range of methodological traditions have focused their analysis on understanding Congress, both as a lawmaking and a representative institution. The purpose of this volume is to take stock of this impressive and diverse literature, identifying areas of accomplishment and promising directions for future work. The editors have commissioned 37 chapters by leading scholars in the field, each chapter critically engages the scholarship focusing on a particular aspect of congressional politics, including the institution's responsiveness to the American public, its procedures and capacities for policymaking, its internal procedures and development, relationships between the branches of government, and the scholarly methodologies for approaching these topics. The Handbook also includes chapters addressing timely questions, including partisan polarization, congressional war powers, and the supermajoritarian procedures of the contemporary Senate. Beyond simply bringing readers up to speed on the current state of research, the volume offers critical assessments of how each literature has progressed - or failed to progress - in recent decades. The chapters identify the major questions posed by each line of research and assess the degree to which the answers developed in the literature are persuasive. The goal is not simply to tell us where we have been as a field, but to set an agenda for research on Congress for the next decade. The Oxford Handbooks of American Politics are a set of reference books offering authoritative and engaging critical overviews of the state of scholarship on American politics. Each volume focuses on a particular aspect of the field. The project is under the General Editorship of George C. Edwards III, and distinguished specialists in their respective fields edit each volume. The Handbooks aim not just to report on the discipline, but also to shape it as scholars critically assess the scholarship on a topic and propose directions in which it needs to move. The series is an indispensable reference for anyone working in American politics. General Editor for The Oxford Handbooks of American Politics: George C. Edwards III

Behind every financial crisis lurks a "political bubble"--policy biases that foster market behaviors leading to financial instability. Rather than tilting against risky behavior, political bubbles--arising from a potent combination of beliefs, institutions, and interests--aid, abet, and amplify risk. Demonstrating how political bubbles helped create the real estate-generated financial bubble and the 2008 financial crisis, this book argues that similar government oversights in the aftermath of the crisis undermined Washington's response to the "popped" financial bubble, and shows how such patterns have occurred repeatedly throughout US history. The authors show that just as financial bubbles are an unfortunate mix of mistaken beliefs, market imperfections, and greed, political bubbles are the product of rigid ideologies, unresponsive and ineffective government institutions, and special interests. Financial market innovations--including adjustable-rate mortgages, mortgage-backed securities, and credit default swaps--become subject to legislated leniency and regulatory failure, increasing hazardous practices. The authors shed important light on the politics that blinds regulators to the economic weaknesses that create the conditions for economic bubbles and recommend simple, focused rules that should help avoid such crises in the future. The first full accounting of how politics produces financial ruptures, Political Bubbles offers timely lessons that all sectors would do well to heed.

Political Game TheoryAn IntroductionCambridge University Press

Democracy is in crisis because voices of the people are ignored due to a politics of mass society. After demonstrating how the French Fourth Republic failed, wherein Singapore's totalitarianism is a dangerous model, Washington is enmeshed in gridlock, and there is a global democracy deficit, solutions are offered to revitalize democracy as the best form of government. The book demonstrates how mass society politics operates, with intermediate institutions of civil society (media, pressure groups, political parties) no longer transmitting the will of the people to government but instead are concerned with corporate interests and have developed oligarchical mindsets. Rather than micro-remedy bandaids, the author focuses on the need to transform governing philosophies from pragmatic to humanistic solutions.

Did mandatory busing programs in the 1970s increase the school achievement of disadvantaged minority youth? Does obtaining a college degree increase an individual's labor market earnings? Did the use of the butterfly ballot in some Florida counties in the 2000 presidential election cost Al Gore votes? If so, was the number of miscast votes sufficiently large to have altered the election outcome? At their core, these types of questions are simple cause-and-effect questions. Simple cause-and-effect questions are the motivation for much empirical work in the social sciences. This book presents a model and set of methods for causal effect estimation that social scientists can use to address causal questions such as these. The essential features of the counterfactual model of causality for observational data analysis are presented with examples from sociology, political science, and economics.

Trading information is an essential aspect of the negotiations that underpin planning practice across the globe. In this book, Alex Lord uses information economics to outline a way of thinking about these negotiations that places the strategies that actors in the planning game use at the heart of the debate. Dialogue between economics and planning theorists has been, until now, rare. Lord argues that information economics' tool kit, game theory – including well-known examples such as the Prisoners' Dilemma, the Stag Hunt game and Follow the Leader – offers an analytical framework ideally suited to unpacking planning processes. This use of game theory to understand how counterparties interact draws together two distinct bodies of literature: firstly the mainstream economics treatment of games in abstract form and, secondly, accounts of actual bargaining in planning practice from a host of international empirical studies. Providing a novel alternative to existing theories of planning, The Planning Gameprovides an explanation of how agencies interact in shaping the trajectory of development through the application of game theory to planning practice.

In this path-breaking book, David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran produce the first unified theory of policy making between the legislative and executive branches. Examining major US policy initiatives from 1947 to 1992, the authors describe the conditions under which the legislature narrowly constrains executive discretion, and when it delegates authority to the bureaucracy. In doing so, the authors synthesize diverse and competitive literatures, from transaction cost and principal-agent theory in economics, to information models developed in both economics and

political science, to substantive and theoretical work on legislative organization and on bureaucratic discretion.

This book provides the reader with the full panoply of political economy tools and concepts necessary to understand, analyze, and integrate how political and social factors may influence the success or failure of their policy goals.

This book presents latest research in the field of Political Economy, dealing with the integration of economics and politics and the way institutions affect social decisions. The focus is on innovative topics such as an institutional analysis based on case studies; the influence of activists on political decisions; new techniques for analyzing elections, involving game theory and empirical methods.

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In 1942, two years after invading France, the Germans implemented their policy of exterminating the Jews. In contrast to Jews in many parts of German-occupied Europe, however, the majority of Jews in France survived, thanks to opposition to the Nazi extermination policy from Church dignitaries and the moral indignation of the average Frenchmen. Seeking to maintain popular support, the Vichy Regime bargained with the Germans over the substance and extent of its collaboration, which the Germans needed in order to hold France. Drawing on German and French sources, Wolfgang Seibel traces the twisted process of political decision-making that shaped the fate of the Jews in German-occupied France during World War II. By analyzing the German-French negotiations, he reveals the underlying logic as well as the actual course of the bargaining process as both the Vichy Regime and the Germans sought a stable relationship. Yet that relationship was continually reshaped by the progress of the war, Germany's deteriorating prospects, France's economic and geopolitical position, and the Vichy government's quest for domestic political support. The Jews' suffering intensified when the Germans had the upper hand; but when the French felt empowered, the Vichy Regime stopped collaborating in the completion of the "final solution." *Persecution and Rescue: The Politics of the "Final Solution" in France, 1940–1944* demonstrates the ways in which political circumstances can mitigate—or foster—mass crime.

Game theory is the mathematical analysis of strategic interaction. In the fifty years since the appearance of von Neumann and Morgenstern's classic *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* (Princeton, 1944), game theory has been widely applied to problems in economics. Until recently, however, its usefulness in political science has been underappreciated, in part because of the technical difficulty of the methods developed by economists. James Morrow's book is the first to provide a standard text adapting contemporary game theory to political analysis. It uses a minimum of mathematics to teach the essentials of game theory and contains problems and their solutions suitable for advanced undergraduate and graduate students in all branches of political science. Morrow begins with classical utility and game theory and ends with current research on repeated games and games of incomplete information. The book focuses on noncooperative game theory and its application to international relations, political economy, and American and comparative politics. Special attention is given to models of four topics: bargaining, legislative voting rules, voting in mass elections, and deterrence. An appendix reviews relevant mathematical techniques. Brief bibliographic essays at the end of each chapter suggest further readings, graded according to difficulty. This rigorous but accessible introduction to game theory will be of use not only to political scientists but also to psychologists, sociologists, and others in the social sciences.

The SAGE Handbook of Research Methods in Political Science and International Relations offers a comprehensive overview of the field and its research processes through the empirical and research scholarship of leading international authors. The book is structured along the lines of applied research in the discipline: from formulating good research questions and designing a good research project, to various modes of theoretical argumentation, through conceptualization, to empirical measurement and analysis. Each chapter offers new approaches and builds upon existing methods. Through its seven parts, undergraduate and graduate students, researchers and practicing academics, will be guided through the design, methods and analysis of issues in Political Science and International Relations discipline: Part One: Formulating Good Research Questions and Designing Good Research Projects Part Two: Methods of Theoretical Argumentation Part Three: Conceptualization & Measurement Part Four: Large-Scale Data Collection & Representation Methods Part Five: Quantitative-Empirical Methods Part Six: Qualitative & "Mixed" Methods Part Seven: EITM & EMTI

One theme that has emerged from the recent literature on political economy concerns the transition to democracy: why would dominant elites give up oligarchic power? This book addresses the fundamental question of democratic stability and the collapse of tyranny by considering a formal model of democracy and tyranny. The formal model is used to study elections in developed polities such as the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Canada, and Israel, as well as complex developing polities such as Turkey. The key idea is that activist groups may offer resources to political candidates if they in turn adjust their polities in favor of the interest group. In polities that use a "first past the post" electoral system, such as the US, the bargaining between interest groups and candidates creates a tendency for activist groups to coalesce; in polities such as Israel and the Netherlands, where the electoral system is very proportional, there may be little tendency for activist coalescence. A further feature of the model is that candidates, or political leaders, like Barack Obama, with high intrinsic charisma, or valence, will be attracted to the electoral center, while less charismatic leaders will move to the electoral periphery. This aspect of the model is used to compare the position taking and exercise of power of authoritarian leaders in Portugal, Argentina and the Soviet Union. The final chapter of the book suggests that the chaos that may be induced by climate change and rapid population growth can only be addressed by concerted action directed by a charismatic leader of the Atlantic democracies.

This book, first published in 2007, is for the applied researcher performing data analysis using linear and nonlinear regression and multilevel models.

Time series, or longitudinal, data are ubiquitous in the social sciences. Unfortunately, analysts often treat the time series properties of their data as a nuisance rather than a substantively meaningful dynamic process to be modeled and interpreted. *Time Series Analysis for the Social Sciences* provides accessible, up-to-date instruction and examples of the core methods in time series econometrics. Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, John R. Freeman, Jon C. Pevehouse and Matthew P. Hitt cover a wide range of topics including ARIMA models, time series regression, unit-root diagnosis, vector autoregressive models, error-correction models, intervention models, fractional integration, ARCH models, structural breaks, and forecasting. This book is aimed at researchers and graduate students who have taken at least one course in multivariate regression. Examples are drawn from several areas of social science, including political behavior, elections, international conflict, criminology, and comparative political economy.

A new introduction to the game theoretic approach to international relations theory. Written for advanced undergraduate and graduate students, this textbook provides the support and background needed for students to gain a thorough understanding of the rationalist approach, from the basic foundations to more complex models.

Political and civil discourse in the United States is characterized by "Truth Decay," defined as increasing disagreement about facts, a blurring of the line between opinion and fact, an increase in the relative volume of opinion compared with fact, and lowered trust in formerly respected sources of factual information. This report explores the causes and wide-ranging consequences of Truth Decay and proposes strategies for further action.

Public policy analysts and political pundits alike tend to describe the policymaking process as a reactive sequence in which government develops solutions for clearly evident and identifiable

problems. While this depiction holds true in many cases, it fails to account for instances in which public policy is enacted in anticipation of a potential future problem. Whereas traditional policy concerns manifest themselves through ongoing harms, "anticipatory problems" are projected to occur sometime in the future, and it is the prospect of their potentially catastrophic impact that generates intense speculation and concern in the present. *Anticipatory Policymaking: When Government Acts to Prevent Problems and Why It Is So Difficult* provides an in depth examination of the complex process through which United States government institutions anticipate emerging threats. Using contemporary debates over the risks associated with nanotechnology, pandemic influenza, and global warming as case study material, Rob A. DeLeo highlights the distinctive features of proactive governance. By challenging the pervasive assumption of reactive policymaking, DeLeo provides a dynamic approach for conceptualizing the political dimensions of anticipatory policy change.

State Management offers a comprehensive yet concise introduction to the new field of state management, presenting an analysis of basic questions within the theories of bureaucracy, policy-making, principal-agent modelling and policy networks. Focussing upon recent state transformation, it illuminates public sector reform strategies such as New Public Management as well as incorporation, tendering and bidding, decentralization, team production and privatization. This book argues that we should look upon the variety of models or approaches to public management or public administration as all belonging under "state management". The so-called "working state" in a well-ordered society involves government delivering services, paying for social security and respecting the rule of law. In this text, Jan-Erik Lane systematically examines the key approaches to the study of how government attempts to achieve these goals, discussing the pros and cons of alternative frameworks of analysis. Each chapter discusses a different issue within state management that is integral to the broader debate, including: Public regulation The relationship between the law and the state Combining ecology and policy making Multi-level governance The virtues and vices of public-private partnerships Policy implementation Presenting a clear overview of how the state operates when government sets out to deliver public services, and generating questions to encourage new research, *State Management* is a valuable new text for both undergraduate and postgraduate courses in political science, public administration and public management.

This book investigates the ideological conditions inducing political actors to highlight corruption issues through valence campaigns. Using case studies and comparative analyses of party programmes, legislative speeches and social media data, the author demonstrates that the more parties and/or candidates present a similar policy programme, the more they rely on valence campaigns. In other words, as the ideologies of parties have become increasingly similar over recent decades, the content of political competition has substantially shifted from policy to non-policy factors, such as corruption issues. These dynamics, and the ideological considerations underpinning them, also provide a novel perspective on recent phenomena in contemporary democracies, such as the growth of negative campaigning, as well as populist strategies based on anti-elite rhetoric. The book will appeal to students and scholars interested in political corruption, valence politics, populism and electoral campaigning.

Political Game Theory is a self-contained introduction to game theory and its applications to political science. The book presents choice theory, social choice theory, static and dynamic games of complete information, static and dynamic games of incomplete information, repeated games, bargaining theory, mechanism design and a mathematical appendix covering, logic, real analysis, calculus and probability theory. The methods employed have many applications in various disciplines including comparative politics, international relations and American politics. *Political Game Theory* is tailored to students without extensive backgrounds in mathematics, and traditional economics, however there are also many special sections that present technical material that will appeal to more advanced students. A large number of exercises are also provided to practice the skills and techniques discussed.

During the 1980s, economic theory has been revolutionised by game theory. The game theory approach is now very widely used throughout the profession and has become a major tool for the construction of new economic models. It is the basic tool in the construction of a modern theory of industrial organisation and it has led to important developments in finance, labour economics and international trade. This major new collection - prepared by a leading international authority - is orientated towards researchers, professors and graduate students who are interested in the interface between game theory and economic theory. They include the seminal and most important recent papers on the development and application of game theory in economics.

"Social interaction is essential to human life. How do people choose what to do when they encounter one another? And how do organizations, firms or countries interact? Game Theory is a modeling tool designed to represent and analyze such strategic interaction. The first part of this book is devoted to introducing the basic building blocks of game theory. The parties to the interaction are called players, the courses of actions available to them are their strategies, and the payoffs of each player from the various profiles of strategies (of all players) represent the way each player ranks the possible outcomes of the interaction from her own individual point of view"--

The *Routledge Handbook of Comparative Political Institutions (HCPI)* is designed to serve as a comprehensive reference guide to our accumulated knowledge and the cutting edge of scholarship about political institutions in the comparative context. It differs from existing handbooks in that it focuses squarely on institutions but also discusses how they intersect with the study of mass behaviour and explain important outcomes, drawing on the perspective of comparative politics. The Handbook is organized into three sections: The first section, consisting of six chapters, is organized around broad theoretical and empirical challenges affecting the study of institutions. It highlights the major issues that emerge among scholars defining, measuring, and analyzing institutions. The second section includes fifteen chapters, each of which handles a different substantive institution of importance in comparative politics. This section covers traditional topics, such as electoral rules and federalism, as well as less conventional but equally important areas, including authoritarian institutions, labor market institutions, and the military. Each chapter not only provides a summary of our current state of knowledge on the topic, but also advances claims that emphasise the research frontier on the topic and that should encourage greater investigation. The final section, encompassing seven chapters, examines the relationship between institutions and a variety of important outcomes, such as political violence, economic performance, and voting behavior. The idea is to consider what features of the political, sociological, and economic world we understand better because of the scholarly attention to institutions. Featuring contributions from leading researchers in the field from the US, UK, Europe and elsewhere, this Handbook will be of great interest to all students and scholars of political institutions, political behaviour and comparative politics. Jennifer Gandhi is Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Emory University. Rubén Ruiz-Rufino is Lecturer in

International Politics, Department of Political Economy, King's College London.

"Any short list of major analyses of Congress must of necessity include David Mayhew's *Congress: The Electoral Connection*." —Fred Greenstein In this second edition to a book that has achieved canonical status, David R. Mayhew argues that the principal motivation of legislators is reelection and that the pursuit of this goal affects the way they behave and the way that they make public policy. In a new foreword for this edition, R. Douglas Arnold discusses why the book revolutionized the study of Congress and how it has stood the test of time.

Within the public sector, strategies are not designed to influence markets, but instead to guide operations within a complex environment of multilateral power, influence, bargaining, and voting. In this book, authors David McNabb and Chung-Shing Lee examine five frameworks public sector organization managers have followed when designing public sector strategies. Its purpose is to serve as a guide for managers and administrators of large and small public organizations and agencies. This book is the product of a combined more than sixty years of researching, teaching and leading organizational seminars on the theory and practice of management applications in industrial, commercial, nonprofit and public sector organizations. The book consists of four parts: Strategic Management and Strategy Fundamentals; Frameworks for Designing Strategies; Examples of Public Sector Strategies; and Implementing Strategic Management.

Throughout, the focus is on the widespread value of strategic management and adopting the strategy appropriate for the organization. Including chapters on game theory, competitive forces, resources-based view, dynamic capabilities, and network governance, the authors demonstrate ways that real managers of public sector and civil society organizations have put strategic management to work in their organizations. This book will be of interest to both practicing and aspiring public servants.

An accessible review of the main approaches in the study of public policy, this text argues that most writers who seek to explain how policy varies and changes use one of the five frameworks: institutional, group/network, socio-economic, rational choice and ideas-based. It describes these methods in detail, offers constructive criticisms and explores their claims in the light of American, British and French examples

The 2016 election of Donald J. Trump invoked a time for reflection about the state of American politics and its deep ideological, cultural, racial, regional, and economic divisions. But one aspect that the contemporary discussions often miss is that these fissures have been opening over several decades and are deeply rooted in the structure of American politics and society. In *Polarization: What Everyone Needs to Know*® Nolan McCarty takes readers through what scholars know and don't know about the origins, development, and implications of our rising political conflicts, delving into social, economic, and geographic determinants of polarization in the United States. While the current political climate seems to suggest that extreme views are becoming more popular, McCarty also argues that, contrary to popular belief, the 2016 election was a natural outgrowth of 40 years of polarized politics, rather than a significant break with the past. He evaluates arguments over which factors that have created this state of affairs, including gerrymandered legislative districts, partisan primary nomination systems, and our private campaign finance system. He also considers the potential of major reforms such as instating proportional representation or ranked choice voting to remedy extreme polarization. A concise overview of a complex and crucial topic in US politics, this book is for anyone wanting to understand how to repair the cracks in our system.

??Given the centrality of political parties in modern democracies, most research on these systems either directly address their internal functioning and activities or question their critical role. Political science has moved from describing institutions to the thorough analysis of behavior within these institutions and the interactions between them. The inevitable consequences of the maturing and institutionalization of the discipline of political science in many countries include the forming of sub-fields and specialized research communities. At the same time the number of democracies has vastly increased since the 1980s and although not each attempt at democratization was eventually successful, more heterogeneous systems with some form of party competition exist than ever before. As a consequence, the literature addressing the large issues of party democracy spreads over many research fields and has become difficult to master for individual students of party democracy and party governance. The present volume sets out to review the behavior and larger role of political parties in modern democracies. In so doing the book takes its departure from the idea that the main contribution of political parties to the working of democracy is their role as vehicles of political competition in systems of government. Consequently the focus is not merely in the internal functioning of political parties, but rather their behavior the electoral, legislative, and governmental arenas. Thus several chapters address how political parties perform within the existing institutional frameworks. One more chapter looks at the role of political parties in building and adapting these institutions. Finally, two chapters explicitly address the party contributions to democracy in established and new democracies, respectively.??

Drawing on the rich resources of the ten-volume series of *The Oxford Handbooks of Political Science*, this one-volume distillation provides a comprehensive overview of all the main branches of contemporary political science: political theory; political institutions; political behavior; comparative politics; international relations; political economy; law and politics; public policy; contextual political analysis; and political methodology. Sixty-seven of the top political scientists worldwide survey recent developments in those fields and provide penetrating introductions to exciting new fields of study. Following in the footsteps of the *New Handbook of Political Science* edited by Robert Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann a decade before, this Oxford Handbook will become an indispensable guide to the scope and methods of political science as a whole. It will serve as the reference book of record for political scientists and for those following their work for years to come.

Oxford Handbooks of Political Science are the essential guide to the state of political science today. With engaging contributions from 71 major international scholars, the *Oxford Handbook of Political Economy* provides the key point of reference for anyone working in political economy and beyond.

Written specifically for graduate students and practitioners beginning social science research, *Statistical Modeling and Inference for Social Science* covers the essential statistical tools, models and theories that make up the social scientist's toolkit. Assuming no prior knowledge of statistics, this textbook introduces students to probability theory, statistical inference and statistical modeling, and emphasizes the connection between statistical procedures and social science theory. Sean Gailmard develops core statistical theory as a set of tools to model and assess relationships between variables - the primary aim of social scientists - and demonstrates the ways in which social scientists express and test substantive theoretical arguments in various models. Chapter exercises guide students in applying concepts to data, extending their grasp of core theoretical concepts. Students gain the ability to create, read and critique statistical

applications in their fields of interest.

This 1969 study considers the relation of sociology to political philosophy and extends traditional political philosophy in the direction of contemporary developments.

Demonstrates that the majority party seizes agenda control at nearly every stage of the legislative process.

Now in its second edition, this popular textbook on game theory is unrivalled in the breadth of its coverage, the thoroughness of technical explanations and the number of worked examples included. Covering non-cooperative and cooperative games, this introduction to game theory includes advanced chapters on auctions, games with incomplete information, games with vector payoffs, stable matchings and the bargaining set. This edition contains new material on stochastic games, rationalizability, and the continuity of the set of equilibrium points with respect to the data of the game. The material is presented clearly and every concept is illustrated with concrete examples from a range of disciplines. With numerous exercises, and the addition of a solution manual with this edition, the book is an extensive guide to game theory for undergraduate through graduate courses in economics, mathematics, computer science, engineering and life sciences, and will also serve as useful reference for researchers.

With entries from leading international scholars from around the world, the International Encyclopedia of Political Science provides a definitive, comprehensive picture of all aspects of political life, recognizing its theoretical foundations and including empirical findings from across the globe. The eight volumes examine all the main subdisciplines of political science and include coverage of comparative politics, epistemology, political economy, political sociology, and international relations. Entries are arranged in alphabetical order, and a list of entries by subject area appears in the front of each volume for ease of use. The Encyclopedia contains a detailed index as well as extensive bibliographical references. Approximately 80 entries on the use of both qualitative and quantitative research methods in political science are provided. The process of democratization will remain a vital topic during the 21st century, and the encyclopedia contains extensive coverage of the evolution of democracy as well as other political systems. Readers will find theoretical and empirical background on other important issues such as global security, the relationship between religion and the state, and political issues related to gender and race/ethnicity. The International Encyclopedia of Political Science provides an essential, authoritative guide to the state of political science at the start of the 21st century and for decades to come, making it an invaluable resource for a global readership, including researchers, students, citizens, and policy makers.

Written for advanced undergraduate and graduate students, this is the first textbook on international relations theory to take a specifically game-theoretic approach to the subject, and provide the material needed for students to understand the subject thoroughly, from its basic foundations to more complex models. International relations theory is presented and analysed using simple games, which allow students to grasp the concepts and mechanisms involved with the rationalist approach without the distraction of complicated mathematics. Chapter exercises reinforce key concepts and guide students to extend the models discussed. Drawing examples from international security, international political economy, and environmental negotiations, this introductory textbook examines a broad array of topics in international relations courses, including state preferences, normal form games, bargaining, uncertainty and communication, multilateral cooperation, and the impact of domestic politics.

A formal model in the social sciences builds explanations when it structures the reasoning underlying a theoretical argument, opens venues for controlled experimentation, and can lead to hypotheses. Yet more importantly, models evaluate theory, build theory, and enhance conjectures. Formal Modeling in Social Science addresses the varied helpful roles of formal models and goes further to take up more fundamental considerations of epistemology and methodology. The authors integrate the exposition of the epistemology and the methodology of modeling and argue that these two reinforce each other. They illustrate the process of designing an original model suited to the puzzle at hand, using multiple methods in diverse substantive areas of inquiry. The authors also emphasize the crucial, though underappreciated, role of a narrative in the progression from theory to model. Transparency of assumptions and steps in a model means that any analyst will reach equivalent predictions whenever she replicates the argument. Hence, models enable theoretical replication, essential in the accumulation of knowledge. Formal Modeling in Social Science speaks to scholars in different career stages and disciplines and with varying expertise in modeling.

Is military power central in determining which states get their voice heard? Must states run a high risk of war to communicate credible intent? In this book, Slantchev shows that states can often obtain concessions without incurring higher risks when they use military threats. Unlike diplomatic forms of communication, physical military moves improve a state's expected performance in war. If the opponent believes the threat, it will be more likely to back down. Military moves are also inherently costly, so only resolved states are willing to pay these costs. Slantchev argues that powerful states can secure better peaceful outcomes and lower the risk of war, but the likelihood of war depends on the extent to which a state is prepared to use military threats to deter challenges to peace and compel concessions without fighting. The price of peace may therefore be large: states invest in military forces that are both costly and unused.

Politicians and pundits alike have complained that the divided governments of the last decades have led to legislative gridlock. Not so, argues Keith Krehbiel, who advances the provocative theory that divided government actually has little effect on legislative productivity. Gridlock is in fact the order of the day, occurring even when the same party controls the legislative and executive branches. Meticulously researched and anchored to real politics, Krehbiel argues that the pivotal vote on a piece of legislation is not the one that gives a bill a simple majority, but the vote that allows its supporters to override a possible presidential veto or to put a halt to a filibuster. This theory of pivots also explains why, when bills are passed, winning coalitions usually are bipartisan and supermajority sized. Offering an incisive account of when gridlock is overcome and showing that political parties are less important in legislative-executive politics than previously thought, Pivotal Politics remakes our understanding of American lawmaking.

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