

community on whose behalf they pronounce. For that community, Law's Empire provides a judicious and coherent introduction to the place of law in our lives. Previously Published by Harper Collins. Reprinted (1998) by Hart Publishing. Essays examine the political basis of law, legal interpretation, economic factors in law, reverse discrimination, and censorship

In the closing decades of the eighteenth century, the newly independent colonies along the mid-Atlantic coast of North America commenced an unprecedented public debate concerning the principles of civil government. The debate culminated in 1787 with the Philadelphia convention where the United States Constitution was drafted and adopted. After

ration
A full discussion on his understanding of rights as "trump cards" which privilege the individual claim over the group policy; the critique of legal positivism; the history of a legal institution according to the analogy of a chain novel; and the insistence upon a theory of adjudication that is both constructive and yet faithful to the deepest intentions of legal documents.

The last decade has witnessed a particularly intensive debate over methodological issues in legal theory. The publication of Julie Dickson's *Evaluation and Legal Theory* (2001) was significant, as were collective returns to H.L.A. Hart's 'Postscript' to *The Concept of Law*. While influential articles have been written in disparate journals, no single collection of the most important papers exists. This volume - the first in a three volume series - aims not only to fill that gap but also propose a systematic agenda for future work. The editors have selected articles written by leading legal theorists, including, among others, Leslie Green, Brian Leiter, Joseph Raz, Ronald Dworkin, and William Twining, and organized under four broad categories: 1) problems and purposes of legal theory; 2) the role of epistemology and semantics in theorising about the nature of law; 3) the relation between morality and legal theory; and 4) the scope of phenomena a general jurisprudence ought to address.

This book assembles leading legal, political, and moral philosophers to examine the legacy of the work of Ronald Dworkin. They provide the most comprehensive critical treatment of Dworkin's accomplishments focusing on his work in all branches of philosophy, including his theory of value, political philosophy, philosophy of international law, and legal philosophy. The book's organizing principle and theme reflect Dworkin's self-conception as a builder of a unified theory of value, and the broad outlines of his system can be found throughout the book. The first section addresses the most abstract and general aspect of Dworkin's work--the unity of value thesis. The second section explores Dworkin's contributions to political philosophy, and discusses a number of political concepts including authority, civil disobedience, the legitimacy of states and the international legal system, distributive justice, collective responsibility, and Dworkin's

concludes with a series of critical questions designed to encourage you to think analytically about the law and the key ideas and debates which surround it. New to this edition Revised to include the most recent scholarship in several areas of jurisprudence, and to reflect the social and political developments that have influenced the law and legal theory Expanded chapters on natural law, legal positivism, realism, rights, and theories of justice New and enhanced discussions of the rule of law, global justice, virtue ethics, human and animal rights, the economic analysis of law, and postmodernist theories Updated suggested further reading lists and questions at the end of each chapter

How do laws resemble rules of games, moral rules, personal rules, rules found in religious teachings, school rules, and so on? Are laws rules at all? Are they all made by human beings? And if so how should we go about interpreting them? How are they organized into systems, and what does it mean for these systems to have 'constitutions'? Should everyone want to live under a system of law? Is there a special kind of 'legal justice'? Does it consist simply in applying the law of the system? And how does it relate to the ideal of 'the rule of law'? These and other classic questions in the philosophy of law form the subject-matter of *Law as a Leap of Faith*. In this book John Gardner collects, revisits, and supplements fifteen years of celebrated writings on general questions about law and legal systems - writings in which he attempts, without loss of philosophical finesse or insight, to cut through some of the technicalities with which the subject has become encrusted in the late twentieth century. Taking his agenda broadly from H.L.A. Hart's *The Concept of Law* (1961), Gardner shows how the key ideas in that work live on, and how they have been and can still be improved in modest ways to meet important criticisms - in some cases by concession, in some cases by circumvention, and in some cases by restatement. In the process Gardner engages with key ideas of other modern giants of the subject including Kelsen, Holmes, Raz, and Dworkin. Most importantly he presents the main elements of his own unique and refreshingly direct way of thinking about law, brought together in one place for the first time.

????????1953??
?????????:????????????????,??

This volume offers a critical interrogation of the widely influential legal and political philosophy of Ronald Dworkin. As the central figure in contemporary Anglo-American legal theory, he has been involved in various debates, in the past mainly with critics on the right, who took issue with his "radical liberalism". In contrast, the authors of this text challenge Dworkin's radical credentials not only with regard to his general political philosophy, but also with reference to his legal theory, his interpretive method and his view of judging. This volume offers a critical interrogation of the widely influential legal and political philosophy of Ronald Dworkin. As the central figure in contemporary Anglo-American legal theory, he has been involved in various debates, in the past mainly with critics on the right, who took issue with his "radical liberalism". In contrast, the authors of this text challenge Dworkin's radical credentials not only with regard to his general political philosophy, but also with reference to his legal theory, his interpretive method and his view of judging.

