





a critical scholarly research publication that focuses on the multidisciplinary aspects of philosophy. Featuring coverage on a wide range of topics such as life-changing events, exemplary figures, and the role of philosophy, this book is geared toward academicians, researchers, and students seeking current and relevant research on the importance of narrative in a multidisciplinary investigation into the identity of people and events.

Science fiction explores the wonderful, baffling and wildly entertaining aspects of a universe unimaginably old and vast, and with a future even more immense. It reaches into that endless cosmos with the tools of rational investigation and storytelling. At the core of both science and science fiction is the engaged human mind--a consciousness that sees and feels and thinks and loves. But what is this mind, this aware and self-aware consciousness that seems unlike anything else we experience? What makes consciousness the Hard Problem of philosophy, still unsolved after millennia of probing? This book looks into the heart of this mystery - at the science and philosophy of consciousness and at many inspiring fictional examples - and finds strange, challenging answers. The book's content and entertaining style will appeal equally to science fiction enthusiasts and scholars, including cognitive and neuroscientists, as well as philosophers of mind. It is a refreshing romp through the science and science fiction of consciousness.

A new collection of wide-ranging essays from one of cognitive science's most distinguished figures. Minds are complex artifacts, partly biological and partly social; only a unified, multidisciplinary approach will yield a realistic theory of how they came into existence and how they work. One of the foremost workers in this multidisciplinary field is Daniel Dennett. This book brings together his essays on the philosophy of mind, artificial intelligence, and cognitive ethology that appeared in inaccessible journals from 1984 to 1996. Highlights include "Can Machines Think?," "The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies," "Artificial Life as Philosophy," and "Animal Consciousness: What Matters and Why." Collected in a single volume, the essays are now available to a wider audience.

First Minds: Caterpillars, Karyotes, and Consciousness presents a novel theory of the origins of mind and consciousness dubbed the Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC). It argues that sentience emerged with life itself. The most primitive unicellular species of bacteria are conscious, though it is a sentience of a primitive kind. They have minds, though they are tiny and limited in scope. Hints that cells might be conscious can be found in the writings of a few cell biologists but a fully developed theory has never been put forward before. Other approaches to the origins of consciousness are examined and shown to be seriously or fatally flawed, specifically approaches based on: (a) the assumption that minds are computational and can be captured by an Artificial Intelligence, (b) efforts to discover the neuro-correlates of mental experiences and, (c) looking for consciousness in less complex species by identifying those that have precursors of those neuro-correlates. Reber shows how each of these approaches is shown to be either essentially impossible (the AI models) or so burdened by philosophical and empirical difficulties that they are effectively unworkable. The CBC approach is developed using standard models of evolutionary biology. The remarkable repertoire of single-celled species that micro- and cell-biologists have discovered is reviewed. Bacteria, for example, have sophisticated sensory and perceptual systems, learn, form memories, make decisions based on information about their environment relative to internal metabolic states, communicate with each other, and even show a primitive form of altruism. All such functions are indicators of sentience. Finally, the implications of the CBC model are discussed along with a number of related issues in evolutionary biology, philosophy of mind, the possibility of sentient plants, the ethical repercussions of universal animal sentience, and the long-range impact of adopting the CBC stance.

"Brain-Mind presents a unified, brain-based theory of cognition and emotion, with applications to the most complex kinds of thinking, right up to consciousness and creativity. Unification

comes from systematic application of Chris Eliasmith's powerful new Semantic Pointer Architecture, a highly original synthesis of neural network and symbolic ideas about how the mind works. Thagard will show the relevance of semantic pointers to a full range of important kinds of mental representations, from sensations and imagery to concepts, rules, analogies, and emotions. Neural mechanisms can then be used to explain many phenomena concerning consciousness, action, intention, language, creativity, and the self. Because of their broad importance, Thagard has tried to make Eliasmith's ideas accessible to a broad audience with no special background in neuroscience or mathematics. The value of a unified theory of thinking goes well beyond psychology, neuroscience, and the other cognitive sciences"--  
"Brilliant...as audacious as its title....Mr. Dennett's exposition is nothing short of brilliant."  
--George Johnson, New York Times Book Review  
Consciousness Explained is a full-scale exploration of human consciousness. In this landmark book, Daniel Dennett refutes the traditional, commonsense theory of consciousness and presents a new model, based on a wealth of information from the fields of neuroscience, psychology, and artificial intelligence. Our current theories about conscious life-of people, animal, even robots--are transformed by the new perspectives found in this book.

The New York Times bestseller – a “crystal-clear, constantly engaging” (Jared Diamond) exploration of the role that religious belief plays in our lives and our interactions For all the thousands of books that have been written about religion, few until this one have attempted to examine it scientifically: to ask why—and how—it has shaped so many lives so strongly. Is religion a product of blind evolutionary instinct or rational choice? Is it truly the best way to live a moral life? Ranging through biology, history, and psychology, Daniel C. Dennett charts religion’s evolution from “wild” folk belief to “domesticated” dogma. Not an antireligious screed but an unblinking look beneath the veil of orthodoxy, *Breaking the Spell* will be read and debated by believers and skeptics alike.

In the years since Daniel Dennett's influential *Consciousness Explained* was published in 1991, scientific research on consciousness has been a hotly contested battleground of rival theories—“so rambunctious,” Dennett observes, “that several people are writing books just about the tumult.” With *Sweet Dreams*, Dennett returns to the subject for “revision and renewal” of his theory of consciousness, taking into account major empirical advances in the field since 1991 as well as recent theoretical challenges. In *Consciousness Explained*, Dennett proposed to replace the ubiquitous but bankrupt Cartesian Theater model (which posits a privileged place in the brain where “it all comes together” for the magic show of consciousness) with the Multiple Drafts Model. Drawing on psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and artificial intelligence, he asserted that human consciousness is essentially the mental software that reorganizes the functional architecture of the brain. In *Sweet Dreams*, he recasts the Multiple Drafts Model as the “fame in the brain” model, as a background against which to examine the philosophical issues that “continue to bedevil the field.” With his usual clarity and brio, Dennett enlivens his arguments with a variety of vivid examples. He isolates the “Zombic Hunch” that distorts much of the theorizing of both philosophers and scientists, and defends heterophenomenology, his “third-person” approach to the science of consciousness, against persistent misinterpretations and objections. The old challenge of Frank Jackson's thought experiment about Mary the color scientist is given a new rebuttal in the form of “RoboMary,” while his discussion of a famous card trick, “The Tuned Deck,” is designed to show that David Chalmers's Hard Problem is probably just a figment of theorists' misexploited imagination. In the final essay, the “intrinsic” nature of “qualia” is compared with the naively imagined “intrinsic value” of a dollar in













